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Abstract. We analyze the Secure Remote Password (SRP) protocol for
structural weaknesses using the Cryptographic Protocol Shapes Analyzer
(CPSA) in the first formal analysis of SRP (specifically, Version 3).
SRP is a widely deployed Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE)
protocol used in 1Password, iCloud Keychain, and other products. As
with many PAKE protocols, two participants use knowledge of a pre-
shared password to authenticate each other and establish a session key.
SRP aims to resist dictionary attacks, not store plaintext-equivalent pass-
words on the server, avoid patent infringement, and avoid export controls
by not using encryption. Formal analysis of SRP is challenging in part
because existing tools provide no simple way to reason about its use of
the mathematical expression “v + gb mod q”.
Modeling v + gb as encryption, we complete an exhaustive study of all
possible execution sequences of SRP. Ignoring possible algebraic attacks,
this analysis detects no major structural weakness, and in particular no
leakage of any secrets. We do uncover one notable weakness of SRP,
which follows from its design constraints. It is possible for a malicious
server to fake an authentication session with a client, without the client’s
participation. This action might facilitate an escalation of privilege at-
tack, if the client has higher privileges than does the server. We conceived
of this attack before we used CPSA and confirmed it by generating cor-
responding execution shapes using CPSA.
Keywords: cryptographic protocols · cryptography · Cryptographic Pro-
tocol Shapes Analyzer (CPSA) · cybersecurity · formal methods · Pass-
word Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols · protocol analysis
· Secure Remote Protocol (SRP) · UMBC Protocol Analysis Lab (PAL).
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1 Introduction
Cryptographic protocols underlie most everything that entities do in a networked
computing environment, yet, unfortunately, most protocols have never under-
gone any formal analysis. Until our work, this situation was true for the widely
deployed Secure Remote Password (SRP) protocol [38–40, 18]. Given the com-
plexity of protocols and limitations of the human mind, it is not feasible for
experts to find all possible structural flaws in a protocol; therefore, formal meth-
ods tools can play an important role in protocol analysis.
Protocols can fail for many reasons, including structural flaws, weak cryp-
tography, unsatisfied hypotheses, improper configuration, inappropriate applica-
tion, and implementation errors. We focus on structural weaknesses: fundamental
logic errors, which enable an adversary to defeat a protocol’s security objective
or learn secret information.
We analyze SRP for structural weaknesses in the first formal analysis of
SRP (specifically, Version 3, known as SRP-3). Using the Cryptographic Protocol
Shapes Analyzer (CPSA) [26] tool in the Dolev-Yao network intruder model [13],
we model SRP-3 and examine all possible execution sequences of our model.
CPSA summarizes these executions with graphical “shapes,” which we interpret.
SRP is a Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol used in
1Password, iCloud Keychain, and other products. As with many PAKE proto-
cols, two participants use knowledge of a pre-shared password to authenticate
each other and establish a session key. SRP aims to resist dictionary attacks,
not store plaintext-equivalent passwords on the server, avoid patent infringe-
ment, and avoid export controls by not using encryption.
Formal analysis of any protocol is challenging, and analysis of SRP is partic-
ularly difficult because of its use of the mathematical expression “v+gb mod q”.
This expression involves both modular exponentiation and modular addition, ex-
ceeding the ability of automated protocol analysis tools to reason about modular
arithmetic. Although SRP claims to have no encryption, ironically, we overcome
this difficulty by modeling the expression as encryption, which effectively it is.
We carried out our analysis using a new virtual protocol analysis lab cre-
ated at UMBC. Embodied as a virtual machine running on the Docker utility,6
this lab includes documentation, educational modules for learning about proto-
col analysis, and three protocol analysis tools: CPSA, Maude-NPA [15, 16], and
Tamarin Prover [14].
Contributions of our work include: (1) The first formal analysis of the SRP-3
protocol for structural weaknesses, which we carried out using the CPSA tool.
Ignoring possible algebraic attacks, this analysis detects no major structural
weakness, and in particular no leakage of any secrets. (2) The discovery of the
first attack on SRP, in which it is possible for a malicious server to fake an
authentication session with the client, without the client’s participation. This
action might facilitate an escalation of privilege attack, if the client has higher
privileges than does the server.
6 www.docker.com
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2 Background and Previous Work
We briefly review formal methods for analyzing cryptographic protocols, CPSA,
PAKE protocols, and previous work on SRP.
2.1 Formal Methods for Analyzing Cryptographic Protocols
Several tools exist for formal analysis of cryptographic protocols, including
CPSA [19], Maude-NPA [15, 16], the Tamarin Prover [33], and ProVerif [5]. Cre-
ated in 2009, CPSA outputs a set of shapes that describe all possible protocol
executions, which can reveal undesirable execution states including ones caused
by adversarial interference. Developed by Escobar et al. in 2009, and written
in the Maude language, Maude-NPA works backwards from explicitly-defined
attack states. The Tamarin Prover uses a multiset-rewriting model particularly
well suited for analyzing stateful protocols. ProVerif is an automated crypto-
graphic protocol verifier that operates on representations of protocols by Horn
clauses. We choose to use CPSA because we are more familiar with that tool,
have easy access to experts, and like its intuitive graphical output.
A variety of additional tools exist to support formal reasoning, including for
cryptography. For example, created in 2009, EasyCrypt7 supports “reasoning
about relational properties of probabilistic computations with adversarial code
. . . for the construction and verification of game-based cryptographic proofs.”
Cryptol [7] is a domain-specific language for cryptographic primitives. Cryptol
allows for the symbolic simulation of algorithms, and thus the ability to prove
properties of such by hooking into various constraint (SAT/SMT) solvers. Addi-
tionally, interactive theorem provers, such as Isabelle or Coq, have been used to
analyze cryptographic functions and protocols [31, 2]. These tools offer the po-
tential to verify any property expressible in their underlying logics (higher-order
logic or dependent type theory, respectively) but sacrifice automation.
The 1978 Needham-Schroeder [30] public-key authentication protocol dra-
matically illustrates the value of formal methods analysis and limitations of ex-
pert review. In 1995, using a protocol analysis tool, Lowe [28] identified a subtle
structural flaw in Needham-Schroeder. This flaw had gone unnoticed for 17 years
in part because Needham and Schroeder, and other security experts, had failed
to consider the possibility that the intended recipient might be the adversary.
Thus, for example, if Alice authenticates to Bob, then Bob could impersonate
Alice to Charlie. CPSA easily finds this unexpected possible execution sequence,
outputting a suspicious execution shape.
Cryptographers sometime present a Universal Composability (UC) proof of
security [8], but such proofs as typically written are long and complex and cannot
be formally verified. For example, Jarecki, Krawczyk, and Xu’s [23] UC proof
of the OPAQUE protocol is in a 61-page complex paper. By contrast, to ana-
lyze SRP-3, CPSA requires only a relatively short and easy-to-verify input that
formally defines the protocol in terms of its variables, the participant roles, and
the messages sent and received.
7 https://www.easycrypt.info/trac/#no1
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2.2 Cryptographic Protocol Shapes Analyzer
The Cryptographic Protocol Shapes Analyzer (CPSA) [19, 32, 26] is an open-
source tool for automated formal analysis of cryptographic protocols. The tool
takes as input a model of a cryptographic protocol and a set of initial assump-
tions called the “point of view,” and attempts to calculate a set of minimal,
essentially different executions of the protocol consistent with the assumptions.
Such executions, called “shapes,” are relatively simple to view and understand.
Executions in which something “bad” happens amount to illustrations of pos-
sible attacks against the protocol. Conversely, when some property holds in all
shapes, it is a property guaranteed by the protocol.
CPSA is a tool based on strand space theory [12], which organizes events
in a partially-ordered graph. In strand space theory, events are transmissions
or receptions of messages, and sequences of events called “strands” capture the
notion of the local viewpoint of a participant in a network. Protocols are defined
as a set of legitimate participant roles, which serve as templates for strands
consistent with the protocol requirements.
“Bundles” are the underlying execution model, in which every reception is
explained directly by a previous transmission of that exact message; a bundle of
a particular protocol is a bundle in which all the strands are either (1) generic
adversary behavior such as parsing or constructing complex messages, or en-
crypting or decrypting with the proper keys, or (2) behavior of participants in
the protocol consistent with the protocol roles.
CPSA reasons about bundles indirectly by analyzing “skeletons,” which are
partially-ordered sets of strands that represent only regular behavior, along with
origination assumptions that stand for assumptions about secrecy and/or fresh-
ness of particular values, such as if a key is never revealed or a nonce is freshly
chosen and therefore assumed unique. Some skeletons represent, more or less,
the exact set of regular behavior present in some bundle consistent with the se-
crecy and freshness assumptions; such skeletons are called “realized” skeletons.
Realized skeletons are a simplified representation of actual protocol executions.
Non-realized skeletons may represent partial descriptions of actual executions,
or may represent a set of conditions inconsistent with any actual execution [26].
The CPSA tool creates visualizations of skeletons as graphs in which events
are shown as circles in columns where each column represents a strand. Ar-
rows between strands indicate necessary orderings (other than orderings within
strands, or those that can be inferred transitively). A solid arrow represents a
transmissions of some message to a reception of exactly that message. A dashed
arrow indicates a message has been altered. The color of circles indicates what
kind of event is depicted: black circles are transmissions and blue ones are recep-
tions, and grey ones deal with state that is assumed to not be directly observable
by an attacker. For example, Figure 3 in Section 5.1 shows such a visualization.
2.3 PAKE Protocols
PAKE protocols evolved over time in response to new requirements and newly
discovered vulnerabilities in authentication protocols [6]. Initially, authentication
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over a network was carried out simply with a username and password sent in
the clear. Unlike terminals hardwired to a computer, networks provided new
and easier ways for intruders to acquire authentication credentials. Passively
monitoring a network often harvested credentials sufficient to gain remote access
to systems. In the 1980’s, Kerberos [34] attempted to mitigate this vulnerability
by no longer transmitting passwords. Unfortunately, the structure of Kerberos
messages and the use of passwords as keys created opportunities for password
guessing and dictionary attacks against the passwords, without requiring the
intruder to acquire the password file directly from the server. Weak, user-chosen
passwords simplified such attacks.
In 1992, with their Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocols, Bellovin and
Merrit [3] evolved PAKE protocols to address the weaknesses in user-generated
passwords as keys. In 1996, that work led Jablon [22] to develop the Simple Pass-
word Exponential Key Exchange (SPEKE), which is deployed in the ISO/IEC
11770-4 and IEEE 1363.2 standards. As did Kerberos, to complicate dictionary
attacks, SPEKE incorporated random “salt” values into its password compu-
tations. Attacks against the protocol in 2004 [41], 2005 [35], and 2014 [21],
prompted modifications to the protocol. Although these and similar protocols
aimed to protect against the use of weak passwords for authentication, none
protected the passwords from attack on the server’s password file. Access to the
server’s password file provided keys to authenticate as any user on the system.
Protection of the server’s authentication file became a primary new require-
ment that Wu [39, 38] aimed to address with the Secure Remote Password (SRP)
protocol in 1998. Wu addressed this requirement by not storing the password,
but instead a “verifier” consisting of a modular exponentiation of a generator
raised to the power of a one-way hash function of the password. Improving on
earlier PAKE protocols, the way SRP incorporates a random salt into the key
computation prevents the direct use of server-stored verifiers as keys. In 2002,
weaknesses discovered against SRP-3 led to a new version, SRP-6 [40].
Unfortunately, for each password, SRP publicly reveals the corresponding
salt, which facilitates pre-computation dictionary attacks on targeted passwords.
Aware of this vulnerability, Wu nevertheless considered SRP a significant im-
provement over what had come before. Avoiding pre-computation attacks led to
new approaches including the OPAQUE protocol [24, 23, 17].
2.4 Previous Work
SRP [37, 36] is a widely used password-authenticated key-establishment proto-
col, which enables two communicants to establish a secret session key provided
the communicants already know a common password. SRP is faster than the
authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, and it aims to avoid patent
infringement and export control. In this protocol, an initiator Alice (typically a
client) authenticates to a responder Bob (typically a server).
In this paper, we analyze the basic version of SRP called SRP-3. In 2002,
Wu [40] proposed a variation called SRP-6, which mitigates a two-for-one attack
and decreases communication times by allowing more flexible message orderings.
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Against a passive adversary, SRP-3 seems to be as secure as the Diffie-
Hellman problem [10, 29, 18]. It remains possible, however, that a passive ad-
versary can acquire information from eavesdropping without solving the Diffie-
Hellman problem. Against an active adversary, the security of SRP-3 remains
unproven.
Wu [39] claims to prove a reduction from the Diffie-Hellman problem to
breaking SRP-3 against a passive adversary, but his proof is incorrect: his re-
duction assumes the adversary knows the password, which a passive adversary
would not know.8 We are not aware of any other previous effort to analyze the
SRP protocol.
Wilson et al. [4] survey authenticated Diffie-Helman key agreement protocols.
Adrian et al. [1] analyze how such protocols can fail in practice. Schmidt et al. [33]
present automated analysis of Diffie-Helman protocols.
As an example of formal analysis of a protocol using CPSA, we note: In 2009,
Ramsdell et al. [32] analyzed the CAVES attestation protocol using CPSA, pro-
ducing shapes that prove desirable authentication and confidentiality properties.
The tool successfully analyzed the protocol despite the presence of hash func-
tions and auxiliary long-term keys. As another example, which illustrates the
utility of service roles, see Lanus and Zieglar [25]
3 The Secure Remote Password Protocol
Figure 1 summarizes how SRP-3 works, during which Alice and Bob establish a
secret session key K, leveraging a password P known to Alice and Bob.
In SRP-3, all math is performed in some prime-order group Zq, where q is a
large prime integer. Let g be a generator for this group. The protocol uses a hash
function h. For brevity, for any x ∈ Zq, we shall write gx to mean gx mod q.
Before executing the protocol, Alice must register her password P with
Bob. Bob stores the values (s, v) indexed by “Alice”, where s is a random salt,
x = h(s, P ) is the salted hash value of Alice’s password, and v = gx is a non-
sensitive “verifier” derived from P , which does not reveal x or P .
SRP-3 works in two phases: I. Key Establishment and II. Key Verification.
The protocol establishes a new session key K known to Alice and Bob, which
they can use, for example, as a symmetric encryption key. Phase I works as
follows.
1. Alice sends her identity “Alice” to Bob.
2. Bob receives Alice’s identity and looks up Alice’s salt s and stored verifier
v = gx, where x = h(s, P ). Bob sends Alice her salt s.
3. Alice receives s, calculates x = h(s, P ), and generates a random secret
nonce a. Alice calculates and sends ga to Bob.
4. Bob receives ga and generates a random secret nonce b and a random scram-
bling parameter u. Bob calculates and sends v+gb to Alice, together with u.
8 Wu incorrectly states the direction of his reduction, but his reduction actually pro-
ceeds in the correct direction.
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P, s, x = h(s, P ), v = gx s, vClient Server
client
s
a, ga ga
ga
gb, u b, u
v + gb,u
K = h((v + gb − v)a+ux)
= h((gb)a+ux)
= h(gb(a+ux))
K = h((ga(gx)u)b)
= h((gagux)b)
= h((ga+ux)b)
= h(gb(a+ux))
h(ga, v + gb,K)
h(ga, h(ga, v + gb,K),K)
Fig. 1. Protocol diagram for SRP-3, which comprises three phases: setup, key exchange,
and key verification. During key exchange, the server transmits to the client the ex-
pression v + gb mod q, which we cannot directly model in CPSA. Variables in dashed
boxes denote values received.
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5. Each party calculates the session key K as the hash of a common value, which
each party computes differently. Alice calculates K = h((v + gb) − gx)a+ux
and Bob calculates K = h(gagux)b.
Thus, in Phase I, Alice and Bob establish a common session key K. In
Phase II, Alice and Bob verify that they have the same session key. Phase II
works as follows.
1. Alice computes M1 = h(g
a, v+gb,K) and sends M1 to Bob. Bob verifies the
received value by recomputing M1 = h(g
a, v + gb,K).
2. Bob computes M2 = h(g
a,M1,K) and sends it to Alice. Alice verifies the
received value by recomputing M2 = h(g
a,M1,K).
3. If and only if these two verifications succeed, the session key K is verified.
4 Modeling SRP-3 in CPSA
Using CPSA, we analyze SRP-3 in the Dolev-Yao network intruder model in
two steps: In this section, we model SRP-3 in CPSA; in the next section, we
interpret shapes produced by our model. Appendix A lists important snippets
of our CPSA sourcecode.
4.1 Challenges to Modeling SRP-3 in CPSA
CPSA provides two algebras to express protocols: basic and Diffie-Hellman. The
basic crypto algebra includes functions that support modeling of pairings, de-
composing a pair into components, hashing, encrypting by symmetric and asym-
metric keys, decrypting by keys, returning the “inverse of a key” (a key that can
be used to decrypt), and returning a key associated with a name or pair of
names. CPSA does not support arithmetic operations. The Diffie-Hellman alge-
bra extends the basic crypto algebra by providing “sorts” (variable types) that
represent exponents and bases, as well as functions for a standard generator
g, a multiplicative identity for the group, exponentiation, and multiplication of
exponents.
SRP-3 is challenging to model in CPSA because CPSA does not support
any of the following computations: addition of bases when the server sends v +
gb, subtraction of bases when the client computes (v + gb) − v, and addition
of exponents (i.e., multiplication of bases) when the client computes the key.
CPSA handles only multiplication of exponents, and cannot be easily modified
to handle these additional algebraic operations, because CPSA makes use of
general unifications in its class of messages, and a full decision procedure in the
theory of rings is undecidable [9].
4.2 Our Model of SRP-3
We model SRP-3 by defining variables, messages, and associated roles. Critical
modeling decisions are how to represent the problematic expression v + gb, how
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to deal with multiplication of bases, and how to handle the initialization phase.
Figure 2 shows the SRP-3 protocol diagram as we modeled SRP-3 in CPSA.
There are two legitimate protocol participants, which we model by the client
and server roles (see Figure 8). We organize each of these roles into two phases:
initialization and main. The initialization phase establishes and shares the pass-
word, and it establishes the salt and verifier in the long-term memory of the
server.
We model the problematic expression v+gb as {|gb|}v, which is the encryption
of gb using v as a symmetric key. Thus, knowing gb requires knowledge of v.
The other problematic expressions occur in the calculation of the key. The
key K is supposed to be equal to (gb)a+ux. Here, each party calculates this
value by calculating gab and gbux and multiplying them together. The client can
calculate these values from gb by raising gb to the a power and to the ux power.
The server calculates these values by raising ga to the b power, and by raising
gx = v to the bu power.
We emulate the multiplication of these base values by hashing them; since
both parties can calculate the two factors, each can calculate the hash of the
two factors. Thus, we represent the key K as K = h(gab, gbux), where h stands
for cryptographic hashing.
Finally, we explain how we model the initialization phase, and in particular,
how the client communicates their salt and verifier to the server. In the beginning
of the client and server roles, one could exchange the salt and verifier as a
message. This strategy, however, would prevent CPSA from exploring scenarios
in which the same client or server conducts multiple executions of the protocol
using the same password information exchanged during initialization. Instead, we
use “service roles,” which provide a function or service to one or more participant
roles. Our service roles exchange values across a secure channel. These values
persist in state that can be accessed only by instances of the appropriate main-
phase roles.
Specifically, the client-init service role initializes a state record with the value
{“client state”, s, x, client, server} (see Figure 8). The “client state” string literal
serves the function of a label, enabling us to write client roles to observe state
that begins with that string. We store the salt and password hash because each
client role directly uses these values. The names of the client and server help to
link the state to the correct client-server pair.
After initializing its state, the client-init role sends a string literal “Enroll”,
together with the salt and verifier. The client-init role encrypts this message
using a long-term key known by the particular client and server. The server-init
role receives this message and initializes the server’s state by storing a string
literal “server record”, the salt and verifier, and the names of the client and
server.
To prevent CPSA from instantiating an unlimited number of server-init and
client-init roles, we add a rule that disregards any executions in which there is
more than one instance of the server-init role for a specific client / server pair,
see Figure 9.
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client-init server-init
“client state,”
s, x
client, server
init
{|“Enroll,′′ s, gx|}client−server
“server record,”
s, v = gx
client, server
init
client server
client
obsv
s
a, ga ga
ga
gb, u b, gb, u{|gb|}v, u
K = h((gb)a, (gb)ux) K = h((ga)b, (gx)ub)
h(ga, {|gb|}v,K)
h(ga, h(ga, {|gb|}v,K),K)
Fig. 2. Protocol diagram for SRP-3, as we modeled it in CPSA. We introduce two
service roles, client-init and server-init, that handle the setup phase by instantiating
values for s, x, and v = gx, and by making these values available to the legitimate
client and server. We model the computation v+gb as an encryption of gb under key v.
Variables in dashed boxes denote values received.
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The model above is sufficient to verify most of the security properties of SRP,
but cannot verify the property that compromise of the server’s authentication
database cannot be used directly to compromise the security and gain immediate
access to the server. The reason is that if SRP meets its security goals, the verifier
v is not leaked to the adversary by the protocol. Therefore, to test whether or not
access to v allows the adversary to impersonate a client to the server, we need
to use a model in which the server-init role is modified to transmit the verifier
it receives for a client. This model provides the adversary with access to v that
they cannot obtain from SRP. For this property, it is sufficient to test only the
server’s point of view. Compromise of a server’s authentication database would
allow anyone to impersonate a server to the client and is not a property that
SRP was designed to prevent.
5 Interpreting Shapes from the SRP-3 Model
We generate and interpret shapes showing executions of our model of SRP-3
under various assumptions from the perspectives of various roles. Specifically,
we define skeletons that provide the perspectives of an honest client and an
honest server, respectively (see Figures 10 and 11). We also define “listeners” to
detect possible leaked values of the password hash x or verifier v (see Figures 12
and 13). Finally, we investigate if an adversary directly using a compromised
verifier could authenticate as a client (see Figure 6). CPSA completed its search,
generating all possible shapes for each point of view (see [27] for an explanation).
Figures 3–6 display selected shapes that highlight our main findings. These
shapes show that, when the client and server are honest, there is no attack
against our model of SRP-3: the only way the protocol completes is between a
client and a server. Similarly, CPSA found no leakage of x or v. CPSA also found
that an adversary directly using a compromised verifier cannot authenticate as
a client without access to internal values of the server.
5.1 Client Point of View
Figures 3 and 4 show the two shapes generated from the perspective of an honest
client. The first shape is what we had expected. One added client-init strand
provides state needed for the client to access password information, and one
added server-init strand provides password information to the server strand. The
solid lines in the shape prove that the messages must come from the expected
parties, and the shape closely reflects the protocol diagram for our model.
The second shape explores the possibility that the adversary could replay the
client’s initial message to the server resulting in the server beginning two protocol
runs with the client. We are able to verify that it is the same server by observing
that the server variables in both strands are instantiated with the same value.
Only one of the server strands is able to complete, because the messages between
the two runs of the protocol cannot be confused. The shape indicates that there
is not any way for the adversary to take advantage of initiating multiple runs of
the protocol with the server.
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serverclient-initserver-initclient
srp3 22 (realized)
Fig. 3. Shape showing an execution of SRP-3 from the client’s perspective. This graph-
ical output from CPSA reveals expected behavior.
serverclient-initserver-initserverclient
srp3 41 (realized)
Fig. 4. Shape showing an execution of SRP-3 from the client’s perspective, with an
additional run of the server. This graphical output from CPSA reveals both server roles
accessing the same state, causing them to behave like two instances of the same server.
The client can begin the protocol with one instance of the server, then complete it with
the other. This unexpected shape does not constitute an attack.
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5.2 Server Point of View
Figure 5 shows the first of two shapes generated from the perspective of an
honest server. As happens for the client, two shapes result. The first shape is
similar to the protocol diagram for our model and is what we had expected. A
client is needed to complete the protocol, as are the service roles server-init and
client-init. The second shape indicates a replay of the client’s initial message
resulting in two server strands with the same server as indicated in the strands’
instantiated variables. As with the additional shape in the client’s view, only
one of the server’s strands is able to complete, indicating that there is no attack
against the protocol from the server point of view.
clientclient-initserver-initserver
srp3 5119 (realized)
Fig. 5. Shape showing an execution of SRP-3 from the servers perspective. This graph-
ical output from CPSA reveals expected behavior.
5.3 Privacy Properties
It is important that the password hash x = h(s, P ) and the verifier v = gx
remain secret. To determine whether a network adversary can observe either of
these values in our model of SRP-3, we define two input skeletons to test these
privacy properties, one for x and one for v (see Figures 12 and 13). Because the
client knows x, we add the listener for x to the client point of view. Similarly,
because the server knows v, we add the listener for v to the server point of view.
Listeners in CPSA represent a test that a value can be found by the adversary.
For each if these skeletons, we ran CPSA. In each case, CPSA returned an
empty tree, meaning that there is no way to realize the skeleton as a shape,
which means that no such attack is possible in our model. In each case, CPSA
ran to completion, indicating that it explored all possible shapes for the model.
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5.4 Leaked Verifiers
CPSA analysis of listeners for v confirms that the SRP protocol does not leak
the verifier v. Therefore, to analyze the protocol when the adversary has access
to v, we modified server-init to leak the verifier to the adversary. In the presence
of this variant of the server-init role, CPSA discovered two main shapes: one is
the ordinary server point of view (Figure 5); the other shows that the adversary
is able to impersonate a client if the verifier has indeed leaked (Figure 6).
The situation is more subtle. The adversary is able to impersonate the client
only if they know both v and b, as an adversary might learn if the adversary
comprised the server. Initially, in our model of SRP-3, we did not require that b
and u be distinct, only that they be uniquely generated. CPSA found the imper-
sonation attack in part because CPSA deduced that the adversary could learn b
if b = u, since SRP-3 reveals u. Subsequently, we added an additional assump-
tion that b 6= u, when CPSA discovered only the the expected shapes. This fact
validates the assertion that SRP is secure from an adversary directly using the
verifier to authenticate as a client without access to internal values of the server.
server-initclient-initserver
srp 7022 (realized)
Fig. 6. Shape showing an execution of SRP-3 from the servers perspective when the
verifier is leaked to the adversary and u = b. This shape indicates an attack where the
adversary completes an authentication with the server impersonating a client.
6 A Malicious Server Attack against SRP
Our analysis in Section 5 assumes that legitimate participants of SRP-3 are
honest, meaning they will execute the protocol faithfully. In this section, we
explore an attack on SRP-3 in which the server is compromised. For example,
an adversary might corrupt the server to run a malicious process. In this attack,
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the malicious server authenticates to itself, pretending to be a particular client,
without the client’s involvement. A possible goal of this attack might be for the
malicious server to escalate its privileges to those of the client, which might be
higher than those of the server.
To analyze this attack, we define a malicious server role, which we call
malserver (see Figure 14). We provide to malserver only the information that an
honest server would have access to by observing the state initialized by a server-
init role. Consequently, malserver must compute the key using the same method
as carried out by an honest server. Malserver also acts like a client, initiating
the protocol and sending messages consistent with those from the client role.
Figure 14 also defines an associated skeleton, which enables CPSA to compute
a strand of the malserver role.
Figure 7 shows the first of two shapes produced by CPSA from the malserver
skeleton. As for honest participants, CPSA also produced a second shape that
shows the protocol can be started and completed with two different honest server
roles on the same machine. Figure 7 shows the malserver initiating the protocol
by sending the client’s name and proceeding to interact with the server as though
it were the client, all the way through to the key verification messages. For
executions with a legitimate client, CPSA adds client-init and server-init strands,
as a result of the setup phase in which a client sends name, salt, and verifier to
the server. Here, however, there is no client strand. The server sends the final
black node on its strand only after the server verifies the hash provided by the
malserver strand, indicating that the server believes it is communicating with
the specified client.
The attack is possible because the malserver role is operating on the server
it is attacking (the server and malserver variables are equal) and has access to
the server’s internal values, as we discuss in the analysis of the leaked verifiers.
Even though this attack is not a part of the Dolev-Yao model that CPSA uses,
by creating a special malserver role outside of the normal protocol roles, we were
able to coax CPSA to explore the attack.
7 Discussion
We briefly discuss two limitations of our work: one arising from our modeling
of the “problematic expression” v+ gb as encryption, the other arising from our
choice of CPSA’s point of view (see Section 2.2).
Modeling the problematic expression as encryption enabled CPSA to carry
out its work. A consequence of this crucial decision, however, is that we analyzed
a slight variation of SRP-3 that might be stronger than SRP-3. By abstracting
these algebraic operations as strong encryption, our analysis cannot find possible
“algebraic attacks” that might take advantage of detailed algebraic relationships.
We are not aware of any such attacks on SRP-3 and do not suspect that they
exist, but we cannot exclude their possible existence. The consequences of this
crucial modeling decision are similar to those from the common practice of mod-
eling a particular encryption function as a strong encryption function, which
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serverclient-initserver-initmalserver
srp3 23 (realized)
Fig. 7. Shape showing an execution of SRP-3 from the perspective of a malicious server.
This graphical output from CPSA reveals that a malicious server can deliberately
act like a client and can authenticate the client with a legitimate instance of itself.
Using only information available to the server role, the malicious server can thereby
potentially inherit a client’s higher privileges.
excludes the possibility of finding attacks that exploit possible weaknesses in the
particular encryption function.
CPSA exhaustively explores possible executions of a protocol from a speci-
fied point of view and set of assumptions. Such analysis holds only when those
assumptions are satisfied for that point of view. For example, initially, CPSA did
not find the malicious server attack described in Section 6. CPSA did not find
this attack because the adversary requires access to variables v and b, that are
not available through the messages exchanged and the assumptions of the model.
We were able to show that SRP-3 does not leak those values. The model also
failed to verify SRP-3’s property that access to the state variable v by the ad-
versary would not allow the adversary to impersonate a client directly. To verify
that property would require a model that made v available to the adversary.
Subsequently, we explored two models to investigate possible impersonation
attacks. One model gave the adversary v; the other model gave the adversary v
and b. With these models, CPSA showed that the adversary can impersonate
the client if they know v and b, but not if they know only v (see Section 5).
Different assumptions and points of view can influence analyses. All formal
method tools explore properties only within a specified scope and do not find
attacks outside that scope. Although CPSA did not initially discover the mali-
cious server attack, we were able to enlarge CPSA’s scope of search to find it. It
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is possible, however, that there might be additional attacks outside our scope of
search.
8 Conclusion
Using CPSA, we formally analyzed the SRP-3 protocol in the Dolev-Yao network
intruder model and found it free of major structural weakness. We did find a
weakness that a malicious server can fake an authentication session with a client
without the client’s participation, which might lead to an escalation of privilege
attack.
Limitations of our analysis stem in part from our cryptographic modeling.
CPSA will not find attacks that exploit weak cryptography, and our use of
CPSA will not find any algebraic attacks. As all tool users must, we trust the
correctness of CPSA and its execution. Our results do not speak to a variety
of other potential issues, including possible implementation and configuration
errors when using SRP-3, and inappropriate applications of it.
Open problems include formal analysis of other PAKE protocols [20], includ-
ing the recent OPAQUE protocol [24, 23, 17], which, unlike SRP, tries to resist
precomputation attacks by not revealing the salt values used by the server.
OPAQUE is the most promising new protocol possibly to replace SRP. Be-
cause quantum computers can compute discrete logarithms in polynomial time,
it would be useful to study and develop post-quantum PAKE protocols [11] that
can resist quantum attack.
We hope that our work, as facilitated by the virtual protocol analysis lab cre-
ated at UMBC, will help raise the expectation of due diligence to include formal
analysis when designing, standardizing, adopting, and evaluating cryptographic
protocols.
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A CPSA Sourcecode
We list critical snippets of CPSA sourcecode that we used to define SRP-3 and
carry out our analysis.
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(defprotocol srp3 diffie-hellman
(defrole client-init
(vars (s text) (x rndx) (client server name))
(trace
(init (cat "Client state" s x client server))
(send (enc "Enroll" s (exp (gen) x) client (ltk client server))))
(uniq-gen s x))
(defrole server-init
(vars (s text) (v mesg) (client server name))
(trace
(recv (enc "Enroll" s v client (ltk client server)))
(init (cat "Server record" s v client server))))
(defrole client
(vars (client server name) (a rndx) (b u x expt) (s text))
(trace
(send client)
(recv s)
(obsv (cat "Client state" s x client server))
(send (exp (gen) a))
(recv (cat (enc (exp (gen) b) (exp (gen) x)) u))
(send (hash (exp (gen) a)
(enc (exp (gen) b) (exp (gen) x)) u
(hash (exp (gen) (mul b a)) (exp (gen) (mul b u x)))))
(recv (hash (exp (gen) a)
(hash (exp (gen) a)
(enc (exp (gen) b) (exp (gen) x)) u
(hash (exp (gen) (mul b a)) (exp (gen) (mul b u x))))
(hash (exp (gen) (mul b a)) (exp (gen) (mul b u x))))))
(uniq-gen a))
(defrole server
(vars (client server name) (a expt) (b u rndx) (s text) (v base))
(trace
(recv client) ; Server receives Client’s name
(obsv (cat "Server record" s v client server))
(send s)
(recv (exp (gen) a))
(send (cat (enc (exp (gen) b) v) u))
(recv (hash (exp (gen) a)
(enc (exp (gen) b) v) u
(hash (exp (gen) (mul a b)) (exp v (mul u b)))))
(send (hash (exp (gen) a)
(hash (exp (gen) a)
(enc (exp (gen) b) v) u
(hash (exp (gen) (mul a b)) (exp v (mul u b))))
(hash (exp (gen) (mul a b)) (exp v (mul u b))))))
(uniq-gen u b))
)
Fig. 8. Modeling of SRP-3 in CPSA. We define four roles: client-init, server-init, client,
and server. The client-init and server-init roles are service roles that initialize common
values between the client and server roles.
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(defrule at-most-one-server-init-per-client
(forall ((z0 z1 strd) (client server name))
(implies
(and (p "server-init" z0 1)
(p "server-init" z1 1)
(p "server-init" "client" z0 client)
(p "server-init" "client" z1 client)
(p "server-init" "server" z0 server)
(p "server-init" "server" z1 server))
(= z0 z1))
)
Fig. 9. Rule added to SRP-3 to prevent CPSA from instantiating an unlimited number
of server-init roles, which would prevent CPSA from terminating.
(defskeleton srp3
(vars (client server name))
(defstrand client 7 (server server) (client client))
(non-orig (ltk client server)))
Fig. 10. Client skeleton of SRP-3, which provides CPSA a starting point for analyzing
SRP-3 from the client’s perspective.
(defskeleton srp3
(vars (client server name))
(defstrand server 7 (server server) (client client))
(non-orig (ltk client server)))
Fig. 11. Server skeleton of SRP-3, which provides CPSA a starting point for analyzing
SRP-3 from the server’s perspective.
(defskeleton srp3
(vars (client server name))
(defstrand client 7 (server server) (client client))
(deflistener x)
(non-orig (ltk client server)))
Fig. 12. Client skeleton of SRP-3 with listener for the value x, which provides CPSA
a starting point for analyzing SRP-3 from the client’s perspective. The listener role
helps CPSA determine whether an execution of SRP-3 can leak the value x.
Formal Methods Analysis of the Secure Remote Password Protocol 23
(defskeleton srp3
(vars (client server name))
(defstrand server 7 (server server) (client client))
(deflistener v)
(non-orig (ltk client server)))
Fig. 13. Server skeleton of SRP-3 with listener for the value v, which provides CPSA
a starting point for analyzing SRP-3 from the server’s perspective. The listener role
helps CPSA determine whether an execution of SRP-3 can leak the value v.
(defrole malserver
(vars (client server name) (a rndx) (b u expt) (s text) (v base))
(trace
(send client)
(recv s)
(obsv (cat "Server record" s v client server))
(send (exp (gen) a))
(recv (cat (enc (exp (gen) b) v) u))
(send (hash (exp (gen) a)
(enc (exp (gen) b) v) u
(hash (exp (gen) (mul a b)) (exp v (mul u b)))))
(recv (hash (exp (gen) a)
(hash (exp (gen) a)
(enc (exp (gen) b) v) u
(hash (exp (gen) (mul a b)) (exp v (mul u b))))
(hash (exp (gen) (mul a b)) (exp v (mul u b))))))
(uniq-gen a)
)
(defskeleton srp3
(vars (client server name))
(defstrand malserver 7 (server server) (client client))
(non-orig (ltk client server)))
Fig. 14. Modeling a malicious server in CPSA. We define the malserver role to behave
like a client while having access to the legitimate server’s initialized variables. The
associated skeleton provides CPSA a starting point for analyzing the malicious server
attack from the perspective of the malicious server.
